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This  discussion  is intended  to help  people understand  the nature
of international  trade,  the problems  and opportunities  we  now  con-
front,  and some  of the  major current  issues  in  foreign  trade.
THE  NATURE  OF  FOREIGN  TRADE
Foreign  trade,  like  any  other  kind  of  trade,  is  based  on  the
principle  of specialization  and exchange,  the economic  apparatus  for
better  living.  With  voluntary  international  trade,  each  country  pro-
duces  those  goods  and  services  for  which  it  has  a  comparative
advantage.  The United States is a large country with a great diversity
of resources  and  skills,  able  to  meet  most  of  her  needs  from  her
own  sources  but  nevertheless  with  a considerable  interest in  foreign
trade.  For  example,  this  country  has  natural  advantages  in  the
production  of  both  machinery  and  wood  products.  Comparatively,
our resources  are better for  production  of machinery  than for  wood.
We,  therefore,  sell  some  of  our  machinery  to  the  Scandinavians  in
exchange  for  some of  their  timber  and  pulpwood.  The  exchange  is
voluntary.  Each  country  exchanges  something  it has  for  something
it would  rather  have.  Thus,  by engaging  in  trade  each country  im-
proves  its  over-all  position.
Basically,  therefore,  foreign trade is like domestic trade,  in which
Pennsylvania  exchanges  steel products for Iowa's pork and beef.  It is
like individual specialization and exchange,  with farmers selling cotton
and  buying  clothes,  though  they  could  and  once  did  produce both.
Foreign  trade,  however,  is  more  complex  than  trade  within  our
own borders.  Various  currencies  are  involved,  more  restrictions  are
used,  and  governments  play  a larger  role.
CHANGING  TIMES
For many  years  we  heard  about  the  "dollar  gap,"  a  shortage  of
gold  and  dollars  abroad  which  limited  exports  from  our  farms  and
factories.  Now  we  hear  about  the  "balance-of-payments  problem,"
referring  to  a  shortage  of gold  and foreign  exchange  (money)  with
which  to meet  international  obligations,  not  abroad  but  here  in  the
United States.
In earlier years,  farmers  were  told that it was  important  to keep
prices of their export  crops competitive,  so they  could move in inter-
national trade.  Now, subsidy makes a number of price-supported crops
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Until  recent  times  farm  exports  went  to  countries  which  had
dollars  (sometimes  these dollars  were  granted  by  the United  States)
and were  limited by the number of dollars these  countries  had.  Now,
through  Public  Law  480,  we  sell  wheat,  cotton,  soybean  oil,  and
other  surplus  products  to countries  which  do  not have dollars.
Formerly  producers  of cotton  and other export  crops  sought the
cooperation  of industry  and labor in support of  a liberal trade policy
which would permit foreigners to earn dollars  with which they might
buy  American  farm  products.  Now certain  sectors  of industry  and
labor  are seeking  the help of farm people in  support of protectionist
trade  policies  to  keep  foreign  goods  out.
What  brought  about  these  changes?  Are  we  truly  in  a  new
situation?  What  constitutes  an  appropriate  modern  trade  policy?
These questions  farmers  are  asking  have their  origin  in major  shifts
in  the  structure  of  foreign  trade,  the  significance  of  which  are  not
fully  realized.  Tracing  these  changes  will  help  farm  people  under-
stand their  new  circumstances.
A  BIT  OF  HISTORY
After  World War  II,  our trading  partners  in Europe  and  Japan
were flat on their backs.  Their farms were damaged  and their factories
lay  in ruins.  Their  reserves  of  gold  and  dollars  had  been  virtually
exhausted;  we  held  the  bulk  of  the  world's  supply  of  gold.  They
could  not buy  our  food  and  industrial  products,  much  though  these
were  needed.
We  undertook  to  help  our  allies  as  well  as  our  former  enemies
get  on  their  feet  economically.  This  effort  came  largely  from  the
hope,  later  rewarded,  that  if  these  countries  could  quickly  recover
their  strength,  they  would  be  heartened  to  continue  as  members  of
the society of free nations.  We felt compassion for people in desperate
need,  and  we  felt  gratitude  for  the  wartime  sacrifices  of  our  allies.
We  believed,  also,  that  a  prosperous  neighbor  is  a  good  customer.
In short, we felt that we stood to gain, diplomatically and economically,
from the early and full recovery  of our international  neighbors.
So we provided  military, economic,  and technical  assistance.  We
exported  capital, both  private  and  governmental.  We  reduced  trade
barriers on a reciprocal  basis, allowing each country more ready access
to the other's market.
And recovery  occurred.  By hard work, resourcefulness,  and  gen-
erally  sound  public  policies,  and  with  our  help,  the  war-devastated
countries  got  back on  their  feet.
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Recovery  came  soon  in  agriculture.  Damage  to  the  fields  and
herds  was  much  less  and  was  repaired  more  quickly  than  damage
to the industrial  plant.
World agricultural production, on a per capita basis, soon exceeded
the prewar  level.  Prices  of farm  products,  which had been relatively
high,  began to  weaken.
World  prices  are  especially  important  for  a  number  of  farm
commodities  which are particularly  dependent  on exports  (Table  1).
TABLE  1.  UNITED  STATES  AGRICULTURAL  EXPORTS:  VALUE
BY  COMMODITY  GROUPS  AND  PERCENT  EXPORTED,  1959-60
Percent of
Exports  (Millions  Production
Commodity Group  of Dollars)  Exported
Wheat and wheat  flour  875  48
Cotton,  excluding  linters  826  44
Animals and  animal products  583  3
Vegetable  oils and oil seeds  546  36
Feed grains,  excluding products  543  9
Fruits  and vegetables  400  13
Tobacco,  unmanufactured  342  29
Rice, milled  136  56
SOURCE:  Foreign  Agricultural  Trade  Outlook  Charts,  1961.
The  United States,  along  with many  other countries,  elected  not
to  follow  the world-wide  downtrend  in  prices  of major export  crops
such  as wheat, rice,  and cotton.  For these crops we  chose to divorce
the  domestic  price  from  the  world  price,  and  to  reach  the  world
market  through  an export  subsidy.  The  effect  of this  policy,  so  far
as  foreign  trade  is  concerned,  has  been  to  shift the  impact  of  farm
price supports.  Were it not  for the  subsidy,  the  effect  would  be felt
very  quickly in the form of reduced export  sales and  sharply reduced
acreage.  With the  subsidy,  the  effect  is  more  dispersed  and  shows
up in  the form  of increased  program  costs,  increased  need  for  pro-
tection  against  imports,  and  encouragement  to  other  countries  to
raise  their support  prices.
We  not  only  divorced  ourselves  from  world  prices  on  certain
crops;  we  also  elected  to escape  from restricting  our exports  to what
could be sold for dollars.  In  1954 we enacted Public Law 480, which
provided that surplus farm products could be sold for foreign currency,
donated  to  needy  people,  and bartered  for  strategic  materials.
We  thus escaped,  for major  farm export  crops,  two  of  the most
powerful  forces  which  discipline  international  trade:  competitive
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exports increased  from less  than 3 billion  dollars  in  1953  to nearly
5 billion dollars in  1960  (Table  2).
TABLE  2.  UNITED  STATES  MERCHANDISE  EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS,
AGRICULTURAL  AND  NONAGRICULTURAL,  1953-60
Exports  Imports
Agri-  Nonagri-  Agri-  Nonagri-
Year  cultural  cultural  Total  cultural  cultural  Total
Billions of Dollars
1953  2.9  9.4  12.3  4.2  6.8  11.0
1954  3.1  9.7  12.7  3.8  6.6  10.4
1955  3.2  11.0  14.2  4.1  7.4  11.5
1956  4.2  13.0  17.2  3.8  9.0  12.8
1957  4.5  14.8  19.3  3.9  9.4  13.3
1958  3.9  12.3  16.2  4.0  9.0  13.0
1959  4.0  12.2  16.2  4.0  11.3  15.3
1960  4.8  14.5  19.4  4.0  10.7  14.7
SOURCE:  Economic  Report  of the  President,  1961.
Recovery  of  World  Industry,  and  Policies  Not  Yet  Resolved
The recovery  of  agriculture  in the  war-devastated  lands was  fol-
lowed by the recovery of industry.  Japan and the countries of Western
Europe now  are modernized  and retooled,  vigorous,  and  competitive.
Whereas  for  a  substantial  period  following  the  war  we  had  a  clear
advantage in the availability,  quality,  and prices  of our manufactured
exports,  we now find that we are challenged in all these respects.
This  should not come  as  a surprise.  It is  the result  of their work
and our  help,  as planned.  What  we  face,  in  fact,  is  the  success  of
our past policies.  These objectives  have been  achieved:
Our allies have become economically  strong.  As one result of this
strength,  better overseas  markets exist  for American  export products.
Our friends in Japan and Western Europe have  held off the threat
of  Communism  and  are  sturdy  members  of  the  community  of  free
nations.
Currency  convertibility,  which  greatly  simplified  the  conduct  of
trade,  has  generally  been  resumed by  our major commercial  trading
partners.
Many  trade  barriers  have been  reduced,  permitting  an expanded
flow of trade with resultant mutual diplomatic and economic benefits.
Clearly, with our earlier objectives  attained and with new hazards
confronting  us,  we  must take  our bearings  and  lay our plans for the
next  stage  of the  journey.
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foreign  trade  objectives  which  we  must  define,  and  what  are  the
alternative  tactics  we might pursue?
But first a word on the meaning of these questions to farm people.
The  Farmer's  Stake  in  Trade  Policy
Farmers who produce the price-supported  crops might be tempted
to  dismiss  foreign  trade  issues  as  unimportant.  With  the  help  of  a
subsidy  they get their  export crops  into the  dollar market.  With  the
help  of  Public  Law  480  they  get  their  products  into  the  countries
which  do not have  dollars.  With the help  of  quotas  the government
keeps  out the dairy products,  the cotton,  the wheat,  feed  grains,  and
special  crops  which  would  otherwise  be  attracted  to  the  United
States  market.
True,  for about  40  percent  of  U.  S. farm  export  products,  the
old  disciplines  of competitive  price  and dollar  availability  still  apply
and are very  real.  But about 60  percent  of our agricultural  exports
now  move  out  of  the  United  States  with  some  form  of  government
assistance.
The  farmer's  concern with  foreign  affairs  thus has  shifted  some-
what.  He  is  still  interested  in  the  conventional  problems  of  foreign
trade  specifically  as a  farmer,  though  less  so  than  formerly.  But he
is increasingly  interested  as a  citizen.  This results  from  the growing
importance  to  all  citizens,  in  a  tinderbox  world,  of  international
affairs  of  all kinds.
This paper, therefore, will deal primarily with the general problems
of foreign  trade as they  affect all of our citizens.
FOREIGN  TRADE  OBJECTIVES
The general objectives  of foreign trade policy for the years  ahead
appear  to be these:
1.  To safeguard  and strengthen  the community of trading nations
of  the  Free  World  to  provide  a  strong  bulwark  against  the
Communist  threat.
2.  To win growing overseas markets for the abundant products of
American  farms  and  factories.
3.  To  obtain  for  our  citizens  the  higher  levels  of  living  which
come  from  international  specialization  and  exchange.
4.  To earn a sufficient  amount of foreign exchange to permit us
to  meet our  international  obligations.
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tion which could come from sudden and sharp increases in the
supplies of certain goods imported into the United States.
The general  objectives  are  not too  different  from  those  we  have
pursued  in  recent  years.  But  in  trying  to  achieve  them,  we  face  a
new  set of  problems.
FOREIGN  TRADE  PROBLEMS
The  difficulties  we  confront  all  relate  in  some  fashion  to  a
major present focus  of foreign trade policy-the  balance-of-payments
problem.
Increased  Imports
With  their industrial  plants  retooled  and  modernized,  Japan  and
the  nations  of  Western  Europe  are  sending  us  a growing  volume  of
manufactured  products,  providing  stiff  competition.  From  1953  to
1960,  our  imports  of merchandise  from  Japan  quadrupled,  and  our
imports from Europe almost doubled.  Japanese  goods of high quality
and excellent  design are being  sold at prices which domestic suppliers
cannot  meet.  European  manufactured  products  arrive  in  increasing
quantities.  For some  textile  and  steel products the increase  has been
very rapid.
This  increase  in  imports,  particularly  when  it  hits  an  industry
concentrated  in  a  certain  area,  creates  for  us  a  difficult  problem  of
idle  plants  and unemployed  labor.
Concern  about these imports,  however,  should be kept in perspec-
tive.  Our merchandise exports have also grown, increasing from about
12 billion dollars in  1953  to over  19  billion dollars in  1960.  In  1960
merchandise  exports  exceeded  imports  by  almost  5  billion  dollars
(Table  2).
Total  imports  amount  to only  about  3 percent  of our  total pro-
duction.  Foreign  trade,  while vitally  important to  specific  industries,
is  a small part of  our total economic  activity.
Private  Investment  Abroad
The  average  hourly  wage  in  the  United  States,  including  fringe
benefits,  is  about  three  times  as  high  as  in  Western  Europe.  The
contrast  with  Japan  is  even  sharper,  and  with  Southern  Asia  it  is
tremendous.  The meaningful  comparison,  of course,  is not wage cost
per hour,  but  total  cost  per  unit of output.  Here  the United  States,
with its  efficient  mass production,  has  an advantage  on many  items.
But  increasingly  we  are being  challenged.
American industries,  confronted with increased imports  produced
by foreign plants with lower labor costs, are countering by establishing
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which they are located,  ship to other countries  such as those in Latin
America,  and often  ship  goods into the  United States  itself.  In each
case  they  supply  markets  with commodities  which  might  have  been
produced  in  this  country  with  American  labor.  Unemployment,
already  a problem,  is thus  aggravated  in certain  areas.
Direct  private  U.  S.  investment  overseas  has  several  effects  on
international  finance.  U.  S.  dollars  that  go  abroad  for  investment
cause  a  drain  on  our current  reserves.  Overseas,  these  investments
represent  American-held  assets  of  considerable  value,  now  totaling
30 billion dollars,  a reserve  similar to that long held by Great Britain.
If earnings  of these industrial plants  are returned to the United States,
they  increase  our  receipts  from  overseas  and  ease  our  balance-of-
payments  problem.  This  has begun,  and  is  well  underway.  A part
of  these  foreign  earnings,  however,  are  reinvested  in  the  countries
where  they were earned.
Responsibility  for  Foreign  Aid
From World War II through  1959  the United States  supplied  80
billion  dollars  of military,  economic,  and technical  assistance  to our
friends overseas.  For the year 1960 the figure was 4.2 billion dollars.
TABLE  3.  NET  U.  S.  GOVERNMENT  OVERSEAS  GRANTS  (EXCLUDING
MILITARY)  AND  U.  S.  DEFENSE  EXPENDITURES  OF
U. S. ARMED  FORCES  ABROAD,  1946-60
Overseas  Defense
Year  Grants  Expenditures
Millions of Dollars
1946  2,274  493
1947  1,897  455
1948  3,894  799
1949  4,997  621
1950  3,484  576
1951  3,035  1,270
1952  1,960  1,957
1953  1,837  2,535
1954  1,647  2,603
1955  1,901  2,823
1956  1,733  2,955
1957  1,616  3,165
1958  1,616  3,412
1959  1,623  3,090
1960  3,000
SOURCE:  The  United States  and  World  Trade,  Challenges and Opportunities,
Final  Report  to the Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce,  United  States
Senate,  by Special  Staff on  the Study  of  U. S.  Foreign  Commerce,  March  14,  1961.
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trial nations of Western Europe.  With the recovery  of these  countries,
we increased our assistance to the developing  nations of Asia,  Africa,
and Latin America  (Table  3).
This effort,  undertaken  to help the Free World counter the  Com-
munist offensive,  gives sign of long duration  and growing  dimensions.
To the degree  that this  aid is  provided in the form of dollars,  it calls
for  increasing  American  exports  sold  in  an  increasingly  competitive
market.  The  American  export  trade  is  taxed  to  its  utmost  to  earn
the dollars with which to finance  this major outlay.
Of course,  to the degree  that help is supplied  in kind rather than
in  dollars (wheat  and machinery  rather  than  gold  and  dollars)  the
balance-of-payments  problem does not arise directly.  It then becomes
a problem of our productive capacity, our willingness  to tax ourselves
for  overseas  development,  and our  willingness  to  transfer  a  part  of
our real  wealth to the  developing  countries.
Protectionism  Abroad
While trade barriers have been gradually lowered throughout much
of  the  world  during  the  past  quarter  of  a  century,  many  obstacles
remain  to  stunt  export  opportunities  for American  goods.
Certain  mutual  tariff  reductions  negotiated  with  the  Europeans
in  past  years  were  effectuated  by  the  United  States,  but  postponed
by  the Europeans  because  of  the "dollar  shortage."  The  reasons  for
postponing  these  trade  liberalizations  have  disappeared  but  some  of
the trade  barriers still  remain,  especially  for  farm  products.
The European Common Market  and European  Free Trade Asso-
ciation, which plan tariff reductions  among their member nations,  are
attempting to develop trading patterns favorable to their own members
rather  than  to  the  Americans.  Again,  this  is  particularly  true  for
agricultural  products.  In  Europe,  as  in most  countries,  agricultural
interests  are protection-minded  and politically  powerful.
Most of the nations of Europe exclude large categories  of Japanese
goods.  The  result  is  that  Japanese  industrial  products,  denied  a
market in Europe,  are disproportionately  directed  toward  the United
States.  We  absorb  them,  with  resulting  adverse  impact  on  the
American  industries  directly  affected.
Travel  and  Service
Americans  travel  overseas  in  growing  numbers,  spending  more
than  a billion  and  a  half dollars  a year,  almost  twice  the  sum  spent
by  foreigners  traveling  in  the  United  States.  In  addition,  American
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than  American  shipping).  The  outlay  totals  a  billion  and  a  half
dollars  annually,  though  this  is  offset  in  large  part  by  the  foreign
exchange  earnings of American  ships and planes.  These expenditures
of dollars  for  travel  and  service,  while  educational  and  economical,
constitute an additional  drain on our reserves.
Flight  of  Capital
With the leading currencies now freely interchangeable,  the move-
ment  of  liquid  funds  from  one  country  to  another  is  easy.  Foreign
holdings  of  U.  S. short-term  liabilities  have  increased  during  each
of the last  11  years  and  now total  19  billion  dollars.
A change  in the interest  rate in  one  country  relative  to  another,
an  upsurge  in  the  market  for  stocks  or  bonds  in  one  country  as
compared  with  another,  or  a  wave  of  apprehension  about  currency
devaluation  may  quickly  deplete  the reserves  of  a  nation which,  on
a  long-run  basis,  is  in  a sound  financial  position.
Balance  of  Payments
The balance of payments is the balance between overseas payments
into  and  expenditures  from  our  reserve  fund.  When  expenditures
exceed  receipts  our  reserve  is  impaired.  The  whole  operation  may
be  likened  to  a  checking  account.  The  gold  reserve  is  our  cash
balance,  totaling  some  17.5  billion  dollars.
We  deposit  in  this  checking  account  what  we  earn  from  the
export  of goods  and  services.  In  1960  the  figures  were:
Billions
Merchandise  exports  $19.4
Returns  on  investments  3.2
Travel  (excluding  military)  1.0
Services  3.7
Total  $27.3
We  "wrote  checks"  against  this  account  as  follows:
Billions
Imports  of  merchandise  items  $14.7
U.  S. defense  expenditures  of  U.  S.
armed  forces  abroad  3.0
Governmental  grants  and  loans  2.8
Private  long-term  investments  abroad  2.5
Travel  1.7
Services  3.9
Other  dollar  outflow  (net)  2.5
Total  $31.1
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dollars.  Payments  exceeded  receipts  by  3.8  billion  dollars,  and  our
balance  was  lowered.
Not  all  the "checks"  we  write  are cashed  at  once.  They may  be
carried  around for a time.  (This is sometimes  profitable since interest
may  be  earned  on  them.)  At  some  future  date  they  will  in  some
fashion  be presented for  payment.  About  19  billion  dollars  of these
short-term  claims  are held  against  our account  by  foreign  countries,
not  counting  about  5  billion  dollars  held  by  international  organiza-
tions.  The possibility that the holders  of these  claims might suddenly
decide  to  cash  them  constitutes  the  short-term balance-of-payments
problem.
The  long-term balance-of-payments  problem,  on the  other hand,
is  characterized  by  the  persistent  tendency,  since  1950,  for  our
payments  to  exceed  our  receipts.
Our  gold  reserve  is  still  the  largest  of  any  nation,  constituting
46  percent  of  the  world's  total.  Our  overseas  assets,  though  not
immediately available for settling our international account,  constitute
an enormous  reserve.  By comparison  with the reserves  kept by most
other countries, our own are large.  The redistribution of gold reserves
during the past 15 years has permitted the re-emergence  of convertible
currencies,  expedited  trade,  and  up to  this  point  has  generally  been
in  the  interest  of ourselves  and our  friends  abroad.
Sizable  needs  are  in  sight  for  military  and  economic  assistance
to our friends overseas.  Serious questions have been asked,  at various
times past, by overseas bankers concerning the soundness of the dollar.
The  dollar  is  now  not  only  our  own  medium  of  exchange,  but  is
also the reserve  currency  for the world.  As leader  of the Free  World
we  have  responsibilities  beyond  those  of  other  nations  and  of
earlier  days.
While  the  redistribution  of  the  world's  gold  reserve  was  whole-
some up to a point,  it should not be allowed  to proceed beyond some
point,  difficult to  determine but nevertheless  real.  Unless the trend is
slowed  and  halted,  we  shall in  time  find  that we  lack  the means  for
settling  our  international  accounts.  We  would  have  to  devalue  the
dollar,  impose  severe  limitations  on  the  international  movement  of
capital,  and practice the very restrictions on international trade against
which we so long counseled  the rest of the world.  It is one thing for
a war-devastated  country  to get  itself into such  a  position.  It would
be  another  thing  for  the wealthy  United States,  recognized  leader of
the  Free World,  to  slip  into  this condition.
We  do  not  need  to  become  panicky.  We  are  a  powerful  and
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is embarrassing,  troublesome,  and awkward.  If we take proper action,
it need  not  become critical.
What  alternatives,  or  what  combinations  of  alternatives,  are
open  to us?
ALTERNATIVE  AND  ASSOCIATED  POLICIES
Many things  could  be  done to  overcome  the  adverse  balance of
payments  and update our foreign trade policies.  These  fall primarily
into  two  major  categories,  those  that  are  restrictive in  nature  and
those  that  are  expansive.
Restrictive  Programs
Restrictive  programs  are those  which  restrict  the expenditure  of
dollars  overseas.  They  would  balance  the  account  by cutting  down
on spending.  Several  alternative  and associated  proposals  have been
made.  These  are  posed  as  questions:
1.  SHUT  DOWN  ON  IMPORTS?
Reducing  imports  would  save  dollars,  as  we  are  so  often  told
by those who  desire  protection  against foreign goods.  Imports  could
be reduced  by increasing  tariffs  or imposing  quotas,  or both.  Legis-
lative  and  administrative  means  could  be  used  to  accomplish  this.
As imports  were reduced,  other things remaining  the  same,  the trade
imbalance  would be  redressed  and the  pressure  on the  dollar eased.
(But  other  things  would  not  stay  the  same,  as  we  shall  soon  see!)
Sizable  tariff  reductions  have  been  made.  In  1932,  before  the
Trade Agreements  Act was passed,  tariff revenues  on dutiable goods
imported  into  the  United  States  equaled  59  percent  of  the  value  of
imported  goods.  By  1958  the  figure  had  fallen  to  11  percent.
The  contention  is  that  this  reduction  has  been  too  great,  that
foreign  goods  have  flooded  in,  that  American  industry  has  been
harmed,  that  the  balance of  payments  has  been  placed  in jeopardy,
and  that  tariffs  should  now  be  increased.
Alternatively,  it is proposed  that quotas be established,  voluntarily
or by  law,  country  by country,  based on some historic  pattern.  The
objective  would be to reduce,  or prevent a rapid increase  in, imports
of  certain  items.
Quotas  interfere  far more  with  trade  than  tariffs.  Quotas  mean
the  regulation,  in  some  form,  of  individual  business  firms,  while
tariffs  merely  raise  a  barrier  and  leave  the  stronger  firms  free  to
climb  over it.  In  time,  a  tariff  becomes  simply an  invisible  part of
the  cost  structure;  a  quota  requires  continued  and  detailed  admin-
istrative intervention.
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by those who  are primarily concerned  with the balance  of payments,
but  by  those  who  want  protection  against  foreign  produced  goods.
But more  is  involved  here  than  first  meets  the  eye.  If  we were
to  raise  tariffs  or  impose  quotas,  other  countries  almost  certainly
would  retaliate.  Since  we  now  export  19  billion  dollars  of  mer-
chandise  and import only  15  billion  dollars  we  would  stand  to  lose
more from a tariff-boosting  contest than we would gain.  Furthermore,
if we  were to increase  our  trade  barriers we  would  create  dissension
among  the  nations  of  the  Free  World  and  weaken  the  alliance  on
which  so  much  depends.  And  we  would  be  denying  ourselves  the
efficiencies which come from international specialization  and exchange.
2.  DISCRIMINATION  AGAINST  LOW-WAGE  COUNTRIES?
Some  people,  fearing  the  competition  of  low-wage  countries,
propose  that tariffs be established  country  by country,  to equalize or
partly  overcome  wage  differentials.  If  this  were  done,  the  tariff  on
textiles  from England  would  be rather  modest,  on  these  same  goods
from Japan much higher,  and on textiles  from India very high indeed.
These  proposals run  directly  counter  to  the most  favored  nation
principle,  long  our  guidepost  in  international  trade  policy.  This
principle holds that any trading advantage  given to one nation  should
be  extended  to  all.
To  impose  a  high tariff  on a  low-wage  country  and to  adopt  a
low  tariff  for  a  high-wage  country  would  deny  markets  to  the
developing  countries  and  inhibit  their  economic  growth.
If this proposal  were  adopted,  international  trade  would  become
stratified.  The wealthy nations would trade mainly with other wealthy
nations,  and  the  poorer  countries  would  trade  mainly  with  one
another.  The  result would  be  a kind  of  economic  caste  system  with
the  poorer  nations  kept  on  their  side  of  the  tracks.
A differential  tariff  would  be in direct  conflict  with the first  four
of  the  foreign  trade  objectives  listed  earlier,  and  would  satisfy  only
the  fifth.
Of  all  the  proposals  offered,  discrimination  against  low-wage
countries is most out of keeping with sound economic principles.
3.  SAVE  FOREIGN  EXCHANGE  BY  DOMESTIC  PROCUREMENT?
We  might  require  procurement  within  the  United  States,  of
virtually all the commodities  and equipment used in overseas economic
development,  used  by the military,  and used  by our government  here
within  our  own  country.  Perhaps  the  largest  dollar-saving  oppor-
tunity  in  this  list  is  the  first,  that  is,  requiring  procurement  within
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Some  initial  steps  in  this  direction  have  already  been  taken.  (For
many years  this procurement  has been largely on a competitive basis,
internationally.  As  our competitive  position has  worsened  the  share
supplied  by American firms has dropped.)  Other dollar-saving oppor-
tunities  of a  kindred  nature  include:  cutting  the  amount  of foreign
goods  which  a  tourist  is  allowed  to  bring  into  the  country  free  of
duty,  reducing expenditures of dollars by military personnel stationed
overseas,  and  shipping more of our merchandise  in American vessels.
We have  good  reason,  under  present  and prospective  conditions,
to provide  our economic  assistance  in  the  form of  commodities  and
capital  goods  which  we  ourselves  produce,  rather  than  in  the  form
of dollars  which  the recipient  nations might  spend  elsewhere.  When
we  were  trying  to build up  the  reserves  of our  industrial  neighbors,
it  made  sense  to  allow  the  recipients  of  our  aid  dollars  to  spend
them  anywhere  they  wished.  But  now  it  does  not  make  sense  to
give dollars  to India,  allow India  to spend these  dollars in Germany,
and then  have  the  Germans  use these  dollars  to  demand  gold  from
our diminishing  stock.
It  may,  in  fact,  soon  be  a  choice  between  fairly  large-scale
assistance,  specifying  procurement  in  this  country,  or  a  restricted
amount of  help if we allow  the recipients  of our dollar  aid  to spend
these  dollars  in  any  country  they  wish.
4.  RESTRICT  THE  OUTFLOW  OF  PRIVATE  CAPITAL?
To  save  dollars,  we  might  clamp  down  on  U.  S.  investment
overseas.  The  building  of  American  branch  plants  throughout  the
world  would  be  slowed  down.  The  outflow  of  dollars  would  be
reduced  and pressure  on our  gold  reserve  diminished.
No  quick  or  general  answer  can  be  given  to  this  proposal.
Certainly  we  have  reason  to  question  the  movement  of  American
investment  funds into developed nations,  some of them "tax havens,"
which  already  have  an  abundance  of  capital.
American capital is needed,  however,  in the developing  countries
of Asia, Africa,  and Latin America.  We  cannot escape responsibility
for  supplying  a  large  part  of  it  in  some  form.  If  we  cut  down  on
the  movement  of  private capital,  we  may  well  have  to  supply  this
capital  from  public sources.
If  we  restrict  the  outflow  of  capital,  American  exports  financed
by this capital would drop.  Restricting the outflow  of private  capital
for  balance-of-payment  reasons  is  short-sighted.  It  is  like  trying  to
save  wheat  by prohibiting  its use  as  seed.
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The  size  of  the  annual  balance-of-payments  deficit  has  been
roughly  equal  to  our  annual  outlay  for  economic  and  military
assistance  overseas.  It is,  therefore,  often  proposed  that we  correct
the imbalance  by sharply reducing  or eliminating  the mutual security
program,  better  known  as  foreign  aid.
This  proposal,  though  popular  with  many  people,  fails  to  take
into  proper  account  the  nature  of the  world  in  which  we  now  live.
We cannot survive without allies. We should nourish economic growth,
representative  government,  and an enterprise  economy  in  any nation
where  these  institutions  might  grow  and  flourish.  The operation  will not  be  successful  in  all  countries,  and  certainly  the  United  States
should not bear the whole burden.  But  the nature of the cold war is such  that a sizable  and perhaps  a growing  overseas  commitment  will have  a strong claim on us for some years to come.  It is in our interest to  have our  allies  (and the neutral  nations)  strong economically  and
militarily.  If  they  are  strong,  they  will  be  less  likely  to  accept  the
blandishments  of  Communism,  or  to  capitulate  to  its  threats.
We  may  encounter  economic  competition  from  the  nations  we
help  develop.  But  as  they  develop  they  will  become  better  markets
for  American  exports.  A prosperous  neighbor  is  a  better  customer.
Trouble is in store in a shrinking world,  when the gap is widened
between  the "have"  and the "have  not" nations,  particularly when the
Communists  lie  ready to exploit the resultant  envy and  ill will.
To  save dollars  by wiser  use of our  foreign  aid budget is  wholly
commendable.  To  try  to  save  by  cutting  back  or  eliminating  the
operation  would  be  "penny  wise  and  pound  foolish."  And  as  has
been  said,  assistance  can  be  provided  in  kind  if cash  is  scarce.
Another  consideration  is that if we  greatly reduce or stop foreign
aid,  other  countries  almost surely would reduce  their purchases  from the United  States.  Thus, the balance-of-payments  problem would con-
tinue,  though  perhaps  on a  diminished  scale.
6.  DEVALUE  THE  DOLLAR?
Devaluation  of the dollar  would  be  an  official  act  of the govern-
ment,  reducing  the  dollar  equivalent  from  the  present  13.71  grains
of gold to a lesser amount.  Expressed in another way,  the government
would  raise  the  official  price  of  gold  from  $35  an  ounce  to  some
higher figure.  If other countries left their currencies unchanged,  which
is  very  unlikely,  their  exchange  rates  against  the  dollar  would  be
altered,  because  the dollar would represent  a smaller  quantity of gold.
The purpose of these changes,  if they were undertaken deliberately,
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pricewise,  in world  markets.
Some  people  say  that  we  have  "priced  ourselves  out  of  foreign
markets."  They  claim  that  we  have  tilted  the  United  States  price
level  upward  through  lax  wage  policy,  short-sighted  administrative
pricing  on the  part of  some  business  firms,  and  indulging  ourselves
with  cheap  credit  and unbalanced  budgets.  Inflation  has  made  the
U.  S.  market  more  attractive  to  foreign  suppliers  and  has  made  it
harder  for us to  sell overseas-hence  the trade  deficit  and  hence  the
case  for  devaluing  the  dollar.
While the flat and general statement that we have "priced ourselves
out of  world  markets"  has  no  firm basis,  this  is  clearly  the situation
for  certain  commodities.
If a  country's price level is high  compared with prices  in another
country,  prices  in  the  two  countries  can  be  realigned  (at  least  for
certain  commodities  and  for  a  limited period  of  time)  by currency
devaluation  on  the  part  of  the  high-priced  country.  The  devaluing
country  cuts  the  gold  content  of  its  currency,  thereby  altering  its
exchange  rate  as  related  to  the  gold-based  currency  of  the  other
country.  If  the  other  country  leaves  its  currency  unaltered,  the
devaluing  country  experiences,  for  a  time  and in terms  of  the  other
country's currency,  a relative reduction  in the prices of goods moving
into and out of its  area.  The result is that  goods can be more  easily
exported,  and  imports  are  not  so  strongly  attracted.
Proposals  that the United  States  devalue  the  dollar  come  chiefly
from  gold-producing  countries  which  would  stand  to  gain  from  an
increase  in  the  United  States  price  of  gold.
What can be  said about  appropriateness  of devaluing  the dollar?
We can say simply that this remedy probably  would not work.  If we
were to devalue,  in all likelihood  many  other  countries  would follow
suit  at once.  Exchange  rates  would  be  the  same  as before,  relative
prices  would  be unchanged,  and the  only countries  to benefit  would
be  those with  gold to  sell,  among  them the  Soviet  Union.  Another
group which would  gain are the  speculators  who  had bought gold in
anticipation  of  devaluation.
Currency  devaluation,  undertaken  deliberately,  borders  on  eco-
nomic warfare.  Undertaken  of necessity,  it is  an admission  of failure
to discipline  the  balance  of  payments.  It is  a  remedy  of  last resort.
The  United  States  is  the  recognized  leader  of  the  Free  World.
The  dollar  is  the  world's  reserve  currency.  We  cannot,  with  the
responsibilities  now  upon  us,  abdicate  our  leadership  and  become
a disruptive rather than a constructive influence in the world economy.
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The  foregoing  proposals  are generally  restrictive.  Proposals  of  a
more constructive nature have in common a desire to correct the trade
imbalance  by  expanding  rather  than  restricting  our  overseas  opera-
tions, by positive rather than negative programs.  This is like a family
which  would  wipe  out  its  deficit  by  increasing  income  rather  than
reducing  expenditures.
Programs  aimed  at  expansion  might  be  of  several  types.
1.  FREE  TRADE?
The  case  for  complete  removal  of  trade  barriers  rests  on  the
valid economic  argument that, other things equal,  maximum efficiency
in  resource  use  would  be  thus  achieved.  However,  the  argument
ignores the economic and political difficulties  of eliminating  or sharply
curtailing  industries  which  have  grown  up  behind  a  tariff  wall.
The  policy  in the  United  States  during  the past  quarter  century
has  been  to  lower  trade  barriers  gradually,  on  a  selective  basis,  in
cooperation  with other  countries,  with provisions  to increase barriers
in  cases  of demonstrated  injury.  As  has  been  shown,  the  effective
level  of  trade  barriers  is  now  about one-fifth  of  what  it  was  before
the  adoption  of this policy.
A  number  of  legislative  and  administrative  stipulations  check
or  counter  the  movement  toward  liberal  trade  policy:
Section  22.  Legal  provision  (Section  22  of  the  Agricultural
Adjustment  Act)  has  been  made  for  imposing  fees  or  quotas  when
imports  threaten  to  impair  a  farm  price-support  program.  Were  it
not  for  this  provision,  any  effort  to  support  farm  prices  above  the
world  level  would  divert  foreign  farm  products  out  of  the  natural
channels  of  international  trade  into  this  country,  where  they  would
displace  American  farm  products  from  the  market  or  themselves
to  into  government  storage.  We  would  then  be supporting  not  just
United States  prices but world  prices.  If prices  of  farm products  are
to be supported above the world level,  then something  like Section 22
is needed,  not so  much to  help the farmers  as to protect the  govern-
ment  from  intolerable  costs.
The Escape Clause.  If an industry can  demonstrate  to the U.  S.
Tariff  Commission  that  it  has  been  injured  as  a  result  of  a  tariff
reduction,  the  Commission  has  legal  authority  to  impose  fees  or
quotas  on  the  article  in  question.  Relatively  few  industries  have
demonstrated  such  injury.  Existence  of the provision  tends  to check
the  zeal  of  those  who  would  reduce  tariffs  sharply  and  provides  a
cushion against genuine cases of injury from import competition.
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ports make us excessively  dependent on foreign sources of supply  for
items critical to the national defense,  fees  or quotas  may be imposed.
By this means  we  build reliance  on our  own  rather than on foreign
sources  of defense-related  items.
Complete  free  trade  would do  away  with  all of these provisions,
as  well  as  with  tariffs  and  quotas  of  a  purely  protectionist  nature.
Complete  free  trade  probably  has  never  existed.  Few  people would
propose  it in its pure  form.  The  United  States has  probably moved
as rapidly  toward  trade  liberalization  as public  policy  consideration
would  permit.
2.  PROMOTE  EXPORTS?
If we  could in  some fashion sharply expand our exports of goods
and  services,  we would  earn  enough  dollars  to  carry  on the  needed
overseas programs  and meet our other international obligations.  This
might  be  done  by:
a.  Applying  strong  government  pressure  to  eliminate  remaining
unjustified  restrictions  on  imports  of  American  goods  into
other  countries.
b.  Increasing government services to exporters-digging out facts,
reporting  market  prospects,  and opening doors  for American
products  overseas.
c.  Making  American  manufacturers,  many  of  whom  have  not
thought  seriously  about export  opportunities,  aware of over-
seas  markets.
d.  Providing  certain  additional  forms  of government  assistance,
such as extending  export  credit insurance.
e.  Promoting  foreign  travel  in  the  United  States,  which  is  an
exchange earner and in effect is an export of American scenery.
These  proposals  have merit,  and to a  degree  have been  adopted.
But  more  remains  to  be  done.  Until  recently  we  have  been  under
no  particular  pressure  to earn  foreign  exchange.  A concerted  effort
would  uncover  many  opportunities.
3.  GET  THE  OTHER  DEVELOPED  NATIONS  TO  PAY  FOR  DEFENSE
AND  ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT?
Japan and the nations of Western Europe have growing economic
strength  and  growing  reserves  of  gold  and  dollars.  With  these  re-
sources they are now picking  up a larger share of the cost for defense
and development  of the  Free World.  But they  have  gone only  part
of the  way.
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States  burden  would  be  correspondingly  eased,  and  pressure  on the
balance  of  payments  would  be  reduced.  It  would  also  make  clear
the  broad  nature  of  responsibility  for  the  defense  and  development
of  the  Free World.
But we  should not delude ourselves.  Even though  we  succeed  in
getting the other countries  to pick  up  a bigger  share  of the  cost,  the
load  on  us  will probably  remain  large.
4.  RENEW  THE  TRADE  AGREEMENTS  EXTENSION  ACT?
This  act,  often  called  the  Reciprocal  Trade  Agreements  Act,  is
the  authority  under  which  the  United  States  has  cooperated  with
other  countries  since  1934  in  mutual  tariff  reductions.  Under  this
act  specific  duties  have been,  on  the average,  more  than  cut in  half.
Meantime,  price  levels  have  more  than  doubled.  Hence,  as  has
been  said,  effective  tariff duties  now stand at  less than  a fifth of their
earlier  level.
The Trade  Agreements  Extension  Act  is  scheduled  to  expire  in
1962.  Already we have divided opinion  about whether the act should
be  extended  in pursuit  of the  liberal  trade  policies  we  have  followed
during  the  past  quarter  century.
The  cause  of  protectionism  within  the  United  States  is  strong
and growing.  With the industrialization  of the South,  a major bastion
of  liberal  trade  is  being  weakened.  Certain  labor  groups,  though
formerly  oriented  toward  liberal  trade,  are  having  second  thoughts.
Certain  industrial  people,  long  protectionist,  find  added  argument
in  the  balance-of-payments  problem.  Farmers,  in  part  relieved  of
the price  and  exchange  discipline  with  regard  to  international  trade,
are inclined to defer  the issue to others.
Some  people contend  that the case for  extending  the  act is  weak
since  the possible  additional  tariff  reductions  are  small  and that the
major present impediments to trade are the quotas  and bilateral  agree-
ments  with  which  Reciprocal  Trade  Agreement  provisions  are  not
well-qualified  to  deal.
But  the  case  for  continued  authority  to  negotiate  tariffs  with
other  countries  is  nevertheless  a strong  one.  We need the machinery
provided  by the Trade Agreements  Extension Act to protect ourselves
from  possible  discrimination  against  the  United  States  by  the  new
European  regional  trading  groups:  the  European  Common  Market
and  the  European  Free  Trade  Association.  As  leader  of  the  Free
World,  the United  States  cannot afford to turn its back on the liberal
trade policies which have helped the nations of the Western Alliance.
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the  province  of  Congress,  with all  the  protectionism  and  log-rolling
that led us  to the Trade Agreements  approach in the first place.
5.  ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE  FOR INDUSTRIES  INJURED BY IMPORTS?
Proposals  have  been  made that injury  resulting  from  imports  be
remedied,  not  by  the  imposition  of  trade  barriers,  but  by  federal
assistance  for reorientation  toward  alternative  products.
For example,  if  imports  of textile  products  were  found  to  have
injured  the  American  textile  industry,  workers  would  be  retrained
for other employment.  New industries would be helped to come into
the  affected  area.  Loans would  be made  at favorable  rates  and  tax
advantages  offered.  These  activities  would  be  undertaken  at  some
public cost.  Thus,  the burden  of economic  change  would be diffused
over  the population  as  a  whole.
Adjustment assistance has not been popular, chiefly because people
do not want to leave their trade and because they doubt the effective-
ness of the adjustment programs.  But the adjustment assistance route
is constructive  because  it fits  the concepts of  economic  growth,  com-
parative advantage,  and international  specialization.  To redress injury
from imports  by  boosting  tariffs  means  a permanent  cost increase  to
the  American  public  for  the  protected  item;  to  provide  adjustment
assistance  calls  for  a  temporary  added  outlay  (until  the  adjustment
is  accomplished).
If adjustment assistance  is to be provided,  a high rate of economic
growth becomes very important.  In order to accomplish the adjustment
toward new industries, it is vital that new industries grow  and develop.
6.  MORE  TRADE  WITH  THE  COMMUNISTS?
U.  S.  trade  with  the  Communist  bloc  is  restricted  by legal  and
administrative  provisions  based  on  both  security  and  nonsecurity
considerations.  These  range  from  a  total  embargo  on  trade  with
mainland China,  through partial obstructions  to trade with the Soviet
Union,  to relatively  liberal trade  with Yugoslavia  and  Poland.
Our  trade  with  the  Communist  bloc  amounts  to  about  one-half
of  one percent of  our total  overseas  trade.  Our trade with the Com-
munist  nations,  even  if  completely  liberalized,  would  continue  to be
small.  They and we are large countries  with similar natural resources.
Hence  we have  relatively  little  need for  trade with  one  another.
The  Communist  bloc  has  launched  an  "economic  offensive,"  of
which  trade  and  aid  is  an  important  part.  From  1954  to  1959,
Communist  trade  with  the  Free  World  increased  from  3.6  to  7.3
115billion  dollars  annually.  Meanwhile,  Communist  bloc  "aid"  to  the
developing  nations  rose from 11  million to 1,405  million dollars.  For
the Communist bloc, trade and aid are interrelated, both being basically
political  decisions  made  by and for the state.
Our own policies regarding trade with the Communist bloc repre-
sent  an uneasy middle  ground,  not basically  changed  during  the  last
decade,  between  further  curtailing such  trade  and liberalizing  it.
Those  who favor liberalization  point out the following  facts:
Our  trade  restrictions  in  no  real  way  prevent  the  Communists
from  getting  what  they  need  or  selling  what  they  wish.  Trading
opportunities  are  available  to  them  with  virtually  all  of  the  other
nations.  They can and  do  copy our machines  and our methods.  We
might  as  well  trade  with  them  and  gain  what  economic  advantage
we  can.  Any  additional  gold  or  dollars  brought  in  by  this  trade
would  help  our  balance  of payments.  Any  surplus  food  we  could
move  would cut our storage  costs.
Trade may be the bridge upon which international  understanding
is  built.  As  nations  trade  they  come  to  understand  one  another
better  and  peace  is  a  more  likely  prospect.  The  old  quotation  is
invoked:  "If goods  don't  cross boundaries,  armies  will."
On the other hand,  those who oppose  liberalization  of trade with
the  Communists  use  these  arguments:
The  Communists  would  gain  from  increased  trade  with  us;  the
prospect  of  gain  is  the  reason  for  their  recent  emphasis  on  trade.
We  should  do  nothing  that  would  result  in  improving  the  position
of  the  Communist  world,  even  if  in  doing  it  we  might  to  some
degree  improve  our  own  position.
We  should  avoid  becoming  dependent  upon  the  state-trading
Communist  nations either  as  a  source  of  supply  or  as  a market  for
our products.  They are unreliable, ruthless,  and dedicated to wrecking
our  system.
Liberalization  of our  long-held  position  would  be  considered  by
the world as a Communist victory,  since  the Communists have sought
it  and  we  have  resisted.  Any  possible  gains  to  us  from  trade  lib-
eralization  would  be  dwarfed  by  this  adverse  development  in  the
propaganda battle.  In fact, say some people, we should further tighten
down  our  trade  restrictions  to  show  our  sturdy  resistance  to  the
Communist  trade  offensive.
The question  of more or less  trade with the  Communist world  is
perhaps primarily a diplomatic and a military question, with economic
considerations  clearly  in  a subordinate  role.
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Communists?"  is probably  a  weak  "yes."  But the tools  available  to
the economist  are  not well  fitted  for supplying  answers  to  questions
that lie primarily in other  fields.
7.  TOUGHEN  UP  ON  WAGE  AND  PRICE  POLICY?
Undoubtedly  we  were  somewhat  self-indulgent  in  terms of wage
and price policy  during  the period when  Japan and Western  Europe
were  recovering  from  the  war.  Since  our  overseas  competition  was
weak,  we  could  and  did  become  lax.  This  laxity  resulted  in  wage
increases  that  consistently  and  substantially  outran  productivity  in-
creases,  administered price increases not justified by costs, government
price-boosting  programs  of  various  kinds,  and  fiscal  and  monetary
policies  that fed  the  fires  of inflation.
Japan  and the  nations of Europe  were  tougher in  terms of wage
and price  policy  than  we  were  during  this  period.  What  we  must
now do, we are told, is to learn again to count costs, to resist unjustified
wage increases and administered price boosts, and to follow responsible
budgetary,  fiscal,  credit,  and  monetary  practices.
The bulk of conservative economic  doctrine favors this  approach.
We  must be  competitive  pricewise,  the  argument runs,  or we would
isolate  ourselves  on  a  plateau  of  high  prices.
The  opposite  view,  widely  held  but  not  well  demonstrated,  is
that  we  must  have  a  certain  amount  of  inflation  in  order  to  keep
our economy  growing.  To  apply the brakes to  wages,  prices,  credit,
and  the  budget  in  order  to  be  competitive  pricewise  would,  it  is
said,  result in  a considerable  amount of unused capacity.  We should
not,  we  are  told,  allow  95  percent  of  our  economy,  our  internal
operations,  to  be  disciplined  by  the  5 percent  of  our  trade  which
is  external.
The truth is that the United States  experienced  economic  growth
during  the  declining  prices  of  the  late  nineteenth  century,  during
the  stable  price level  of  the  1920's,  and during  the  rising  prices  of
the  postwar  period.  And  the  rates  of  growth  during  these  periods
were  reasonably  similar.
For the United States to try to remove herself from the environment
of world  prices  would be  a long  step  toward economic  isolationism.
It would be better  for us to  help  create a  wholesome world environ-
ment  in  which  we  and  other  nations  can  participate  jointly,  with
mutual  benefits.
AMERICA  MUST  DECIDE
When  a  family considers  what it  must do  about its  receipts  and
expenditures  in  order  to  protect  its  bank  balance,  it  brings  under
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of alternative  behavior patterns.  The same applies to a country.  We can readily  see  that foreign  economic  policy involves,  in one  fashion
or another,  almost  every  aspect  of American  economic  life.
And  we  should  think  about  these  things  before  an  emergency
arises.  A family or  a nation which considers  its problem deliberately,
while its reserves  are  still  adequate,  will  make  a better  decision  than
a family  or  a nation  which postpones  review  until the  checks  begin
to bounce.
Some  countries  of the  world live  under  the  shadow  of  a  chronic
balance-of-payments  problem.  While  they  are  not  happy  with  the situation,  they  have  learned  to  live  with  it.
For  us,  a  balance-of-payments  problem  is  novel,  unique,  and baffling  because  so  many  years  have  elapsed  since  we  had  to  be concerned  with  such  a  situation.  We  need  to recognize  that having
a  balance-of-payments  problem  is  rather  normal  for  a  country,  just as  it  is  fairly  normal  for  a  family  to  have  problems  with  its  bank
balance.  The difficulty  comes, not from having  a balance-of-payments
problem,  but from trying to live  as if it  were not  a problem.
Liberal  trade  policies  (which  generally  facilitated  rather  than restricted  international  trade)  served  us  well  during  the  years  when our  allies had a balance-of-payments  problem.  The  present challenge
is  to make  the  necessary  changes,  within  a  liberal  trade  policy,  that will  permit  us  to  redress  our  own  imbalance.  Having  helped  other
nations  overcome  their  problem,  we  should  be  able  to  muster  the imagination  and  energy  needed  to  overcome  our own.
SUMMARY
Trade  policy,  like  any  other  major  undertaking,  includes  the
objectives,  the  strategy,  and  the  tactics.  The  objective  is  the  goal.
Strategy is  the basic  plan  for  reaching  the  goal.  The tactics  are the
day-to-day  operations  within  the  strategic  plan.
In  trade  policy,  the goal,  generally  accepted  and  unchanged  for
generations,  is the success  of the free  society.
The  strategy  of  international  trade,  changed  but  slightly  with
passing  time  and  not  really  at  issue,  is  to  reach  the  five  objectives
listed earlier.
The  tactics,  which  change  with  new  circumstances  and  about
which  there  is  much  dispute,  involve  the  six  restrictive  and  seven
expansive  policy  proposals  listed  as  questions  and  discussed  in  this
paper.  To  the writer,  those  proposals  which looked  to  trade expan-
118sion  seemed  in  general  more  promising  than  those  which  involved
restrictions.
The important point in  trade policy,  or in  any policy,  is to  keep
the goal, the strategy,  and the tactics properly related to one another.
Particularly  must  we  be  willing  to  subordinate  the  tactic  (which  is
flexible)  to  the  strategy  (which  is  firm)  and  to  the  goal  (which  is
fixed).  We must  not allow  our enthusiasm  for  some tactic  to  result
in treating  it as  if it were  the goal.
TABLE  4.  U.  S.  AGRICULTURAL  EXPORTS,  PERCENT  WITH
GOVERNMENT  ASSISTANCE,  1953-60
AND  WITHOUT
Competitive,  With Government Assistance
for  With Subsidy,  Non-Dollar
Year  Dollars  for Dollars  Movement  Total
1953  65  21  14  100
1954  66  14  20  100
1955  61  13  26  100
1956  46  14  40  100
1957  36  23  41  100
1958  40  30  30  100
1959  43  22  35  100
1960  42  29  29  100
SOURCE:  Foreign Agricultural  Trade  Outlook  Charts,  1961.
TABLE  5.  ESTIMATED  GOLD  RESERVES  AND  DOLLAR  HOLDINGS  OF
FOREIGN  COUNTRIES  AND  INTERNATIONAL  INSTITUTIONS,




Continental Western Europe  6.1  20.4
United Kingdom  2.0  4.8
Canada  1.6  4.0
Latin America  3.1  3.7
Japan  .3  2.0
Other  Asian countries  1.6  2.3
All  other  countries  .7  1.3
International institutions  3.3  6.8
Total  18.7  45.3
SOURCE:  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin.
119TABLE  6.  EXPORTS  AND IMPORTS  OF MERCHANDISE  AND  THE
GROSS  NATIONAL  PRODUCT,  UNITED  STATES,  1946-60
Imports
Net  Gross  as a
Merchandise  Merchandise  Merchandise  National  Percent
Year  Imports  Exports  Exports  Product  of GNP
Billions of Dollars
1946  5.1  11.7  6.6  210.7  2.4
1947  6.0  16.0  10.0  234.3  2.6
1948  7.6  13.2  5.6  259.4  2.9
1949  6.9  12.1  5.2  258.1  2.7
1950  9.1  10.1  1.0  284.6  3.2
1951  11.2  14.1  2.9  329.0  3.4
1952  10.8  13.3  2.5  347.0  3.1
1953  11.0  12.3  1.3  365.4  3.0
1954  10.4  12.8  2.4  363.1  2.9
1955  11.5  14.3  2.8  397.5  2.9
1956  12.8  17.4  4.6  419.2  3.1
1957  13.3  19.4  6.1  442.8  3.0
1958  13.0  16.3  3.3  444.2  2.9
1959  15.3  16.2  .9  482.1  3.2
1960  14.7  19.4  4.7  503.2  2.9
SOURCE:  Economic  Report  of the  President,  1961.
TABLE  7.  HOURLY  WAGES  AND  FRINGE  BENEFITS  IN  MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES  IN  NINE  COUNTRIES,  APRIL  1959
Hourly Cash  Fringe Benefits  Total Labor
Country  Wages  per Hour  Cost per Hour
Italy  $  .35  $  .26  $  .61
Netherlands  .44  .13  .57
France  .47  .24  .78
West Germany  .54  .24  .78
Belgium  .56  .17  .73
Switzerland  .67  .10  .77
United  Kingdom  .68  .10  .78
Sweden  .94  .14  1.08
United States  2.22  .46  2.68
SOURCE:  The  United  States and  World  Trade,  Challenges  and Opportunities,
Final  Report  to  the  Committee  on  Interstate  and  Foreign  Commerce,  United  States
Senate,  by  Special  Staff on the  Study  of  U. S.  Foreign  Commerce,  March  14,  1961.
120TABLE  8.  U.  S.  TRADE  WITH  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES
Japan  EEC Countriesl  EFTA Countries2
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Year  to  from  to  from  to  from
Millions of Dollars
1953  680  261  1,501  1,049  1,025  992
1955  648  432  2,127  1,138  1,495  1,029
1957  1,234  600  3,198  1,547  1,859  1,804
1959  935  1,029  2,395  2,401  1,557  1,804
1960  1,328  1,149  3,437  2,263  2,277  1,608
1 Germany,  France,  Italy, Netherlands,  Belgium, Luxembourg.
2 Britain,  Sweden,  Norway,  Denmark,  Austria,  Portugal,  Switzerland.
SOURCE:  Same  as  Table  7.
TABLE  9.  NET  DIRECT  U.  S.  INVESTMENT  ABROAD,  1946-59
Millions  Millions
Year  of Dollars  Year  of Dollars
1946  230  1953  721
1947  749  1954  664
1948  721  1955  779
1949  660  1956  1,859
1950  621  1957  2,058
1951  528  1958  1,094
1952  850  1959  1,310
SOURCE:  Same  as  Table  7.
TABLE  10.  MAJOR  U.  S.  GOVERNMENT  FOREIGN  ASSISTANCE,
POSTWAR  AND  1960
Type of Assistance  Total Postwar  1960
Billions of Dollars
Net grants of military  supplies
and services  26.5  2.0
Other  aids
Net grants, less conversions  34.0  1.6
Net credits, including  conversions  12.0  .1
Net accumulation  of foreign
currency  claims  2.6  .4
48.6  2.1
Investment  in four  international
financial institutions  4.9  .1
Total  80.0  4.2
SOURCE:  Same  as  Table  7.




Latin America  8.2
Western Europe  5.3
Other  6.0
All areas  29.7
SOURCE:  Same  as  Table  7.
TABLE  12.  UNITED  STATES  BALANCE  OF  PAYMENTS,  1946-60
Increase (+)  or
Increase (+)  or  Decrease (-)
Decrease  (-)  in Foreign
Increase (+)  or  Out-  in Foreign  Holdings of
Decrease (-)  movement (-)  or  Holdings of U.S.  U.S. Govt.
in Over-all  Inmovement  (+)  Short-Term  Long-Term
Year  Balance  of Gold  Liabilities  Securities
Millions of Dollars
1946  +  933  +  623  - 310
1947  +4,862  +2,850  -2,012
1948  +1,006  +1,530  +  524
1949  +  211  +  164  - 47
1950  -3,602  -1,743  +  918  +941
1951  - 343  +  53  +1,055  -659
1952  -1,092  +  379  +1,169  +302
1953  -2,102  -1,161  +1,023  - 82
1954  -1,516  - 298  +1,210  +  8
1955  -- 1,149  - 41  +  579  +529
1956  - 968  +  306  +1,409  -135
1957  +  468  +  798  +  382  - 52
1958  -3,477  -2,275  +1,171  +  31
1959  -3,862  - 731  +2,426  +669
1960  -3,800  -1,700  +2,100
SOURCE:  Same  as Table  7.
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